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NOTES
PURCHASE BY A CORPORATION OF ITS OWN PREFERRED
SHARES WITH DIVIDENDS IN ARREARS
A frequent theme in discussions of corporate finance is the weak position of
the preferred shareholder in the typical corporate structure. The common
shareholders, by virtue of their greater voting rights and ultimate control of
management, have a position of superior power which can be exploited to enrich the common at the expense of the preferred shareholders. This power is
often exercised to eliminate dividend arrearages on cumulative preferred stock
by means of charter amendments, mergers, and sales of corporate assets, on
terms of questionable fairness to preferred shareholders. Although such use of
these devices has provoked continuing criticism,' another means of arrearage

I Scaling Down of Arrearages on Cumulative Preferred Stock, 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 645
(1937); Dodd, Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 780 (1942); Becht,
The Power to Remove Accrued Dividends by Charter Amendment, 4o Col. L. Rev. 633
(i94o); Dodd, Accrued Dividends in Delaware Corporations-From Vested Right to Mirage,
57 Harv. L. Rev. 894 (1944).
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elimination--the purchase by a corporation of its own preferred shares after
dividends have been passed and arrearages accumulated-has received little
attention; this notwithstanding the fact that repurchase operations, unlike
charter amendments, mergers, or sales of corporate assets, can be accomplished
without voting or bargaining by the preferred shareholder-the class whose
interests may be adversely affected.
When cumulative dividends remain unpaid over a substantial period, preferred shares usually sell on the market at prices substantially below their total
liquidating preference, including arrearages. 2 Under these circumstances, the
directors of the issuing corporation, allied primarily with the common stockholders,3 find corporate purchase of the preferred stock at depressed market
price attractive,4 particularly when the prospects of a more prosperous future
2 Curtis Publishing Company's $7 cumulative preferred stock entitled upon liquidation
to $ioo plus accrued and unpaid cumulative dividends sold at prices ranging from $38 to
$63.5o in 1939. On July 2, 1939, unpaid cumulative dividends amounted to $06.75. Moody's
Manual of Investments, Industrial Securities 2574 (1940). On December 31, 1939, dividends
in arrears on National Refining Company's $6 prior preferred stock entitled to $io5 plus
dividends in case of liquidation amounted to $i9.5o. The price range in 1939 was from $28
to $48. Ibid., at 1772.
3 See Dodd, Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 780, 792 (1942).
4 Contrary to the rule in England, American jurisdictions have permitted a corporation to
repurchase its own shares under a variety of circumstances. The statutory and case law for all
American jurisdictions is collected in Nemers, The Power of a Corporation to Purchase Its
Own Stock, 1942 Wis. L. Rev. 1i6. In no jurisdiction has the existence of accrued and unpaid
cumulative dividends been held to preclude the reacquisition of preferred shares by purchase.
The SEC, however, has taken a stand against such purchases in a closely analogous situation. Under Rules U-gC-3 (i4) and U-r2C (b), prescribed pursuant to Sections 9 (c) and 12 (c)
of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 49 Stat. 817, 823 (935), I U.S.C.A. §§ 79 i, 1
(Supp. 1945), any registered holding company wishing to purchase more than i per cent of the
outstanding securities of its own issue or as a subsidiary must receive the prior approval of the
SEC. The SEC has withheld approval when purchases of the subsidiary's stock were to be
made at a time when dividends on the parent company's preferred stock were in arrears, on
the ground that "the Company should not employ cash, which has accumulated because of
the failure to pay preferred stock dividends, for the acquisition of securities of its subsidiaries."
In the Matter of the United Light and Power Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 2348
(194o). A registered holding company was granted permission to repurchase some of its own
shares in the Matter of the Commonwealth & Southern Corp., Holding Company Act Release
No. 693o (r946). Despite the existence of substantial arrearages on the stock to be repurchased
the Commission granted the application because the market price was almost equal to the
redemption value. The Commission's opinion implied that if there had been a large differential,
approval would have been withheld.
Rule N-32C-I, prescribed by the SEC pursuant to Section 23(c)3 of the Investment Companies Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 825 (i94o), 15 U.S.C.A. §8oa-23 (Supp. 1945), prohibits over-thecounter repurchases by registered closed-end investment companies of their own preferred
stock if cumulative dividends are in arrears. Investment Company Act of i94o, Release
No. 415 (1942).
The Commission's recognition of the dangers implicit in such repurchases is also reflected
in the requirement that prospectuses of securities registered under the Securities Act of 1933
disclose that the issuer has power to repurchase stock while dividends are in arrears, when
such is the case. There is no specific rule or instruction imposing the requirement, which has
been adopted as "an implementation of the statutory purpose that registration statements and
prospectuses which form a part of such statements, contain a full and fair disclosure of the
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suggest that dividends will be available to the common if preferred arrearages
can be eliminated.5
Activities of the Curtis Publishing Company afford a striking illustration of
the use of the repurchase technique and its impact on the interests of the preferred and common shareholders.6 In 1925 the capital stock of the company consisted of 9oo,ooo shares of common stock. In that year 9oo,ooo shares of cumu-

lative preferred were issued, each share being entitled to a $7 annual dividend
and $xoo plus arrearages on liquidation. The shareholders' resolution authorizing the issuance of the preferred stock permitted repurchases by the company,
"with or without inviting tenders at any price below $I20 a share and accumulated unpaid and accrued dividends thereon. ' ' 7 Preferred dividends were paid
in full from 1926 to 1932. In 1933 preferred dividends were not fully paid, and
by 1939 the arrearages amounted to $16.871 per share, or a total of $i2,426,ooo.

In the seven-year period during which the arrearages were accumulating,
the company spent $5,782,325 in the purchase of preferred stock at prices rang-

ing from $44 to $i16.8 The corporation thus expended in the reacquisition of its
own preferred shares funds that could have been used to pay almost half of the
accumulated preferred dividends. The purchases were apparently made through
stockbrokers with no general disclosure to shareholders that the corporation
was the purchaser. 9 After the purchase operations were completed, $2o,ooo,ooo
character of the securities proposed to be publicly offered." Letter from Baldwin B. Bane,
Director of the Corporation Finance Division, Securities and Exchange Commission, October
25, 1946.

s Most of the considerations discussed in this note are also applicable to repurchases of
cumulative income bonds which provide for payment of "interest" at the discretion of the directors, and on which arrearages have accumulated.
6Johnson v. Fuller, 121 F. 2d 618 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1941).
7Resolution of Stockholders' Meeting of the Curtis Publishing Company. Meeting Held
1925. Stipulation Exhibit No. i, Johnson v. Fuller, 12 F. 2d 6x8 (C.C.A. 3rd,
1941).

December i6,

8
The following figures, indicating sums expended in the acquisition of preferred shares, are
compiled from the testimony of Cary W. Bok, Treasurer of the Curtis Publishing Co., as
reported in Appellant's Appendix, pp. 66-78, containing excerpts from the transcript in
Johnson v. Fuller, 121 F. 2d 618 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1941):
Year

No. of Shares Purchased

1933

549

1934

T,119

1937

25,000

1938
1939

46,745

53,460

Cost

$

64,087

128,326
1,142,167

2,388,173
2,059,572

Arrearages at Year's End

$ 5-25
.

8.o0
7-75
12.25

16.871

During the 1933-39 period approximately $3oo,ooo in reacquired shares were resold

leaving net purchases of $5,471,000.
9 Cary W. Bok, Treasurer of the Curtis Publishing Co., gave the following testimony
as to his reasons for purchasing the company's preferred stock:
Q. Now can you tell us the reason for the purchase of that stock?
A. Yes, sir. If you remember, 1937 was not an easy year to invest, and my predecessor had
done some very fine investing in the past and the portfolio had in it a great number of securities

NOTES

in earned surplus remained on the books of the company.' 0 In i94o, the company adopted a plan of recapitalization involving the creation of a prior preferred stock and the elimination of the remaining arrearages by the exchange of
old preferred for new prior preferred stock. The validity of the plan was upheld
in Johnson v. Fuller.'!
By these repurchase operations the management of the Curtis Publishing
Company eliminated liquidating preferences, including arrearages, in the total
sum of $14,347,366, at a cost of only $4,782,325. Perhaps more significantly,
the elimination of arrearages in the sum of $1,65oo66 reduced by that amount
the barrier against payment of dividends to the common stock. And prospectively an annual dividend preference of $888,81 was wiped out.
The arguments used to justify repurchase operations- similar to those of
Curtis are far from persuasive. It has been said that such repurchase operations
benefit the corporation as a whole. However, the benefit which results accrues
largely to the common shareholder13 and under certain circumstances to the
preferred shareholders who do not sell. In either case, the resultant benefit is
that seemed to me to be terribly high, such as Allegheny 4's, for fifteen year maturity at 128.
Itwas a very hard time to look around and find any good buys to put surplus money in. I do not
like to have millions and millions lying looselyin the bank, andwith your ultra-safe investment
like Municipals and Governments, and high ground where there is more chance of their going
down than up, I talked it over with various people in the company and recommended that we
buy some of our own preferred stock which was selling in the forties; and if you cannot invest
on the outside, it is sometimes good to invest in yourself.
Q. Better if you invest in yourself out of surplus than to pay dividends out of surplus?
A. It seemed to me a good thing to do-to buy in our own stock out of surplus.
Q. Did you consider that a question of paying dividends out of surplus instead of investing
out of surplus in your own stock?
A. I approached it purely, sir, in the idea that we had all that extra money-I could not
find anything else to put it into; therefore it seemed a good idea to cut down our own debtsour own obligations.
Q. You knew that in 1937 there was an arrearage of $7.75, didn't you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. But in spite of that you thought it was best for your company to buy stock on the
market, of your company, out of surplus rather than to pay dividends out of surplus, didn't
you?
A. Yes, sir.
Excerpts from the transcript appearing in Appellant's Appendix, p. 71, Johnson v. Fuller,
121 F. 2d W1(C.C.A. 3rd, 1941).

10 Johnson v. Fuller,
" 121

121

F. 2d 618, 620 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1941).

F. 2d. 6W8 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1941).

- The arguments discussed herein have been gathered from correspondence with a number
of lawyers and brokers in the Chicago area.
13 The common shareholders generally have sufficient voting power to control the directorate. Thus, although the preferred shareholders in the Curtis Publishing Company were entitled to vote share for share with the common after one quarterly dividend had been
passed, a two-for-one stock split in 1929 doubled the number of common shares so that there
were i,8oo,ooo shares of common stock authorized and only gooooo preferred shares.
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generally achieved by a deliberate sacrifice of the interests of the selling preferred shareholders.4
The common stockholders benefit because repurchases not only eliminate
at bargain rates the preferred's prior claims to assets in the form of liquidation
preferences, but also reduce total arrearages and future preference claims to
dividends, thereby paving the way for a resumption of dividend payments to
the common stockholders. The benefit to the nonselling preferred shareholder
is more doubtful. Repurchases reduce the number of equal claimants to dividend and liquidation payments, and under certain circumstances, could theoretically accelerate the full payment of arrearages on outstanding preferred
stock. This acceleration might occur, for example, where the market price for
the shares repurchased is not substantially above their accumulated arrearages,
where earnings after purchases will be high, and where the directors will be
willing to devote these earnings to the payment of arrearages. However, business uncertainties, the probable reluctance of directors to discharge substantial
arrearages, and the possibility that the original repurchase operations will be
followed by a recapitalization plan which will eliminate remaining arrearagess
make the possible advantage to the nonselling shareholder remote. In any
event, the nonselling preferred might well prefer that the excess funds be used
to give them a small present dividend rather than the possibility of a larger one
in the indefinite and speculative future.
It has also been argued that repurchases benefit the selling preferred shareholder by raising the market price. This argument is not persuasive where the
market price is depressed by the very fact of arrearages, which perhaps have
been deliberately permitted to pile up with a view to depressing the market.
Furthermore, an announcement that excess funds would be used to discharge
arrearages might have a better effect on market prices than would repurchases. ,'6
Such use of excess funds would seem to be required, at least by the spirit of the
preferred shareholders' contract.
Repurchase operations are sometimes supported by another argument, that
they permit the corporation to reduce its annual dividend claims when it is
overcapitalized. This argument ignores the fact that an unequal and uncompensated sacrifice is imposed on the preferred shareholder in order to improve
the capital structure. This is in direct contrast to the treatment accorded prior
creditor claimants in reorganizations under the Bankruptcy Act.

7

Moreover,

14 It should be observed, however, that there may be a tax advantage to the shareholder
who sells to the corporation and realizes a capital gain instead of receiving a payment of
dividend arrearages which are taxable as ordinary income.
XSSuch a recapitalization plan followed the Curtis repurchases. Johnson v. Fuller, ia F.
2d 618 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1941).
6
, Latty, Fairness-The Focal Point in Preferred Stock Arrearages Elimination, 29 Va. L.
Rev. 1, 17 (1942).
-7

Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. io6 (x939).
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the alleged benefit from the reduction of preferred claims to future earnings,
i.e., the possibility of new common stock financing, is seldom realized in
practice., 8
Despite the manifest inequities which repurchase operations often impose on
preferred stockholders and the unconvincing character of the arguments advanced to justify those operations, the question of their legality has not apparently been squarely presented to the courts. It may be useful, however, to
speculate on possible remedies available either under state law or under the
Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act.
Repurchase operations could be attacked under state law as a breach of the
director's fiduciary obligations. Although the fiduciary relationship which
exists between the directors and an individual stockholder has not been clearly
defined, conventional doctrines of fiduciary responsibility afford a basis for imposing on management an obligation to deal fairly with different classes of
stock,/9 to treat members of the same class equally,2 and to make full disclosure
to shareholders dealing with the corporation.I There would be added argument
for imposing such obligations where management by virtue of large holdings of
common stock derives a direct and substantial personal benefit from repurchase
operations.It is clear from the analysis of the impact of repurchase operations on the
preferred shareholders' rights, previously set forth, that the customary repurchase operation violates these fiduciary obligations. Accordingly, a shareholder
who has not sold should be able to enjoin such repurchases; a preferred shareholder who has sold, especially if management failed to disclose that the corporation was the purchaser, might be permitted to rescind; a nonselling shareholder might also be able to require the directors to resell the treasury shares
and to hold the directors liable for damages if there had been any decline in the
market price. And where the funds which are to be used for purchases are available for dividends, the preferred shareholder might be able to compel the distribution as dividends of the sum set aside by the directors for repurchases. The
directors' reliance on the usual defense of the sanctity of their discretion as to
payment of dividends 2 3would not be persuasive since the decision to repurchase
implies that the funds earmarked for this purpose are not needed for operations
and are, therefore, available for dividends.
0

is Dodd, Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 780, 783 (1942); ScalingDown of Arrearages on Cumulative Preferred Stock, 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 645, 654 (1937).
'9 Berle and Means, The Modem Corporation and Private Property 261 (1936).
20 Ibid., at 263.
21For a discussion of the fiduciary obligation of directors under these circumstances, see
SEC Action against Fraudulent Purchases of Securities, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 769, 775 (1946).
= Berle and Means, The Modem Corporation and Private Property 263 (1936).
23New.York, Lake Erie & Western R. Co. v. Nickals, 119 U.S. 296 (1886).
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When, as in the Curtis case, a specific power to repurchase preferred shares
with arrearages has been reserved by the corporation, the corporation may urge
that this reservation bars relief, since the preferredshareholders have specifically
agreed to these operations. However, where palpable unfairness is authorized by
the terms of the reservation, it may well be invalidated as repugnant to the
basic obligation of fair treatment which the directorate owes to the preferred
shareholder. Moreover, such a reservation of power should not bar relief when
repurchases are a part of a conscious program to depress market prices by withholding dividends since it could hardly be urged that the corporation had by
contract secured this power to defraud the preferred shareholder. Finally, despite the explicit reservation, in cases where the corporation failed to disclose
both that it was the purchaser and relevant facts regarding current and prospective financial conditions, the preferred shareholder could base his claim for relief
on nondisclosure by the fiduciary.
When repurchase operations are carried out pursuant to a conscious plan to
depress the market price of the preferred, the elements of a common-law fraud
and deceit action are present, and relief on this theory might be forthcoming.
The directors have implicitly misrepresented a material fact, the reason for
withholding dividends. This misrepresentation was made with the intent that
the shareholder should rely upon it and sell, and the shareholder who sells has
relied upon the misrepresentation to his ultimate detriment.
The remedies under state law are reinforced and may be supplemented by
the higher standards of conduct and disclosure which the SEC is imposing on
purchasers of securities. The primary basis for the SEC's program is Rule
X-IoB-5, adopted under Section io(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.24
This rule strikes at fraudulent and deceptive purchases as well as sales of securities. An analysis of the recent SEC cases under Rule X-IoB-5 reveals that the
SEC has imposed strict fiduciary obligations on management and controlling
shareholders purchasing stock from and engaging in related transactions with
individual stockholders.25 However, the SEC cases involved an aggregate of
items, including occasionally affirmative misrepresentations and constituting
in total effect flagrant nondisclosures which probably would be deemed improper in state courts. Moreover, the SEC cases have involved situations where
insiders with large holdings have sought direct personal profit by instigating
corporate purchases from uninformed holders at cheap prices. 6 Accordingly, it
is not clear from these cases whether Rule X-ioB-5 would reach the simple
situation where a corporation without any disclosure purchases its own pre34 48 Stat. 89i (1934), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (Supp. 1945).
25 See SEC Action against Fraudulent Purchasers of Securities, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 769, 779
(x946), for a discussion of cases under Rule X-ioB-5.
26 See Matter of Purchase and Retirement of Ward La France Truck Corp. Class "A" and
Class "B" Stocks, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3445 (1943); SEC v. Boyd Transfer
& Storage Co., SEC Litigation Releases Nos. 295, 308 (1945).
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ferred shares with arrearages in a depressed market under circumstances where
direct financial gain to the directors is a negligible consideration. The SEC rule
is, however, sufficiently elastic to require disclosure, in the foregoing situation,
particularly where the repurchase operations, viewed against the background of
low market price and prospective increases in earnings, erode substantial rights
of the preferred shareholder. Moreover, when repurchases are preceded by a
conscious program to depress the price of the preferred stock, they clearly violate Rule X-ioB- 527 and make applicable the civil and criminal penalties provided for such violations. 28 It is not certain whether individual stockholders
injured by such a scheme also have a civil action under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.29

It would appear desirable for the Commission to resolve existing uncertainties by promulgating a rule requiring corporations to make adequate disclosure before embarking on a repurchase program. Such a rule would benefit
management by eliminating the necessity for determining whether a particular
transaction would, in the absence of disclosure, be deceptive, and by affording
protection against any claim by common stockholders and nonselling preferred
stockholders that such disclosure was unnecessary and violated their interests
by increasing the cost of repurchases. The primary benefits of such a rule would,
of course, go to the preferred stockholders who would receive the information
necessary for an informed judgment as to whether to sell as well as information
necessary for a timely recourse to their remedies under state law. Moreover, in
its practical operation, the mere requirement of disclosure would probably
generate two healthy tendencies. It would eliminate repurchase operations or
confine them to situations where they were not grossly unfair. It would also
tend to raise the level of fiduciary responsibility, not only under federal securities legislation but also under state law.
27 Mr. Edward H. Cashion, Counsel to the Corporation Finance Division, Securities and
Exchange Commission, has said: ...... when such omissions of material facts are part of a
plan or program of an issuer-and those in control-to repurchase its securities at prices which
they have deliberately depressed by inadequate disclosure of the financial condition of the
company and by withholding dividends, the retention of which could clearly serve no proper
corporate purpose, at the same time using such surplus earnings to repurchase its securities to
the disadvantage of the public shareholders and to the advantage of those in control, it is my
opinion that a scheme to defraud has been employed within the meaning of Rule X-ioB-5."
Address of Edward H. Cashion before the National Association of State Securities Commissioners, St. Louis, Mo., December 13, 1945.
28 Under Section 21(e) of the Securities Act of 1934, the SEC may seek injunctions against
violations of its rules. 48 Stat. 9oo (1934), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78U (Supp. 1945). Revocation of the
registration of broker-dealers violating rules prescribed under Section io (b) is authorized by
Section i5(c)x, 49 Stat. 1377 (i936), as amended, 52 Stat. 1075 (1938), IS U.S.C.A. § 780
(Supp. 1945). Criminal penalties are provided by Section 32 (a), 48 Stat. 9o4 (1934), as amended, 49 Stat. 1380 (1936), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff (Supp. 1945).

29 See SEC Action against Fraudulent Purchasers of Securities, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 769, 779

(1946).
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While the law remains unsettled, underwriters of preferred shares might well
insist upon, the insertion of a charter provision restricting the repurchase of
shares while cumulative dividends remain unpaid.30
30 Inquiries at a dozen law firms in the Chicago area revealed that a small minority of the
preferred stock certificates drafted recently by those firms had included prohibitions against
the repurchase of cumulative preferred stock bearing arrearages. A considerably larger number of certificates, but still a minority, included a requirement that if arrearages exist purchases
must be made "in accordance with a purchase offer made to all holders of preferred stock" or
"pursuant to a call for tenders" sent to all holders of preferred stock.

